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A prerequisite to control of the sea was control of the air above it. In the first days of the war, the Japanese prevented the British from interfering with the movement of troops to Malaya by a successful aerial attack on the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. To drive the enemy from the air in vital areas was the first mission of naval aviation. With the development of night tactics this became a 24-hour job which required specially equipped night planes as well as conventional day fighters. For patrol planes it meant the ability- to penetrate enemy-held areas alone, to possess the firepower necessary to drive off interceptors, .and to return to base with vital information. When the Catalina proved to have insufficient speed and armament to defend itself, the Navy obtained Liberators for use in forward areas. Even this type did not have enough guns and required other modifications to change it from a high-level bomber into a patrol plane. From experiments that amounted to altering 50 percent of the Liberator’s internal arrangements, the Navy developed the Privateer. In 1944 and 1945, planes of these 2 types flew 15,000 patrols and destroyed 504 of the 937 Japanese aircraft encountered, against a loss of 18. During the same period, Mariner and Coronado flying boats on similar missions shot down 24 enemy planes and lost 3. In 1943, Japanese night torpedo attack indicated a need for night fighters, but neither the Army nor Navy had suitable radar-equipped planes available. Royal Air Force experience favored the development of specially designed twin-engine, two-seater aircraft. Since the Navy could neither wait for the completion of the new planes nor could it hope to operate them from carriers without further design changes, it equipped a number of its standard Hellcats and Corsairs with the necessary instruments and developed special training for night pilots. Before the Army’s Black Widow reached the Pacific theater the Navy had night fighters on all large carriers and at land bases in forward areas. Fighter directors worked out a technique by which interceptions were made as far as 80 miles from base. With a loss to themselves of 3 aircraft. Hellcats alone shot down 163 enemy planes in night combat. Important as were these special aspects of air activities, the enemy lost the major portion of his air forces in conventiona l daylight operations. Although, owing to the destruction of Japanese records, exact figures will never be obtainable, naval aviation accounted for threefifths or almost 15,000 of the total enemy planes destroyed. Of these, the most reliable record credits 9,000 as having been shot down and the remainder as having been knocked out on the ground. In aerial combat the Navy lost only 897 aircraft for an advantage of 10 to 1. Even during the period of heavy losses in 1941-42, naval aircraft destroyed 830 enemy planes while suffering 265 air combat losses for a favorable ratio of 3 to 1. In 1944 when naval aviation cracked the enemy air defenses of Rabaul and carried the offensive to the Marshalls, Carolines, Marianas, and Bonins, and to the extensive chains of enemy air bases in the Philippines and Formosa, the ratio rose to 15 to 1; 4,021 Jap planes shot down against 261 air combat losses. In 1945 when the naval offensive concentrated on the Ryukus and Japan, the ratio rose further to 22 to 1; 3,161 Japanese planes shot out of the air against 146 losses suffered at the hands of enemy pilots. The above figures, include the air engagements 726015--47---4 43 of all types of naval aircraft. Fighter planes naturally enjoyed a superior record and destroyed 13 Japanese planes in the air for each 1 lost in combat. During the last 12 months of the war, the Hellcat, mainstay of the carrier forces, knocked down 3,518 Jap planes against a 1oss of 160; the Corsair, used by both Navy and Marine pilots, 1,042 against 49; the Wildcat, used on escort carriers, 377 against 9 losses. These ratios were 22 to 1, 21 to 1, and 42 to 1, respectively. Control of the air was also reflected in the ability of a bombing effort to reach the enemy and the corresponding ability to break up and prevent an enemy attack from reaching its objective. During 1944 and 1945, Navy and Marine dive-bombing and torpedo planes made 102,000 sorties against the Japanese, engaged in combat on 742 occasions, and lost only 18 planes to enemy fighters. Although many of these flights occurred in areas where the enemy’s air force had already been annihilated, the remainder indicated the effectiveness of the cover furnished by Navy fighters. Even in 1942 when the Japanese air force was at its peak, it customarily lost 20 to 40 percent of its aircraft in any mission encountered by Navy planes. Although complete figures are not available for both land and carrier-based aircraft, the latter destroyed 70 percent of the enemy bombers and 50 percent of the fighters intercepted. No air force could stand such losses over an extended period of time without becoming in fact, if not in name, a suicide force. The Kamikaze merely acknowledged an existing situation. Aerial combat was essentially a defensive function designed to protect the fighter’s own air-borne or surface forces from direct attack. If freed from this duty, the fighter plane could perform operations of an offensive nature. Of 500,000 sorties flown by naval fighter planes in the Pacific war, only 12,000, or 21/2 percent, resulted in aerial combat; the remainder was largely for other purposes. More than able to overcome air-borne opposition, naval aviation pressed its attack against airfields and grounded planes. Because during amphibious operations vast numbers of ships in a restricted landing area were especially vulnerable to bombing, the fast carriers first tried to clear the air of enemy planes and then went on to destroy parked aircraft and to render fields inoperable, thus stopping hostile air activity at the source. Approximately one-third of the sorties by carrier aircraft were for this purpose and in some campaigns the number reached twothirds. Although at no time was it possible to dispense with combat air patrols only about 28 percent of the enemy aircraft destroyed were shot down in the defense of United States forces as against 32 percent in the air over enemy ships and installations and 40 percent on the ground. In overcoming the Japanese in the air, carrier planes destroyed 18 enemy to each of their own that was lost, while naval and Marine land-based aircraft enjoyed an advantage of 8 to 1. The disparity resulted not from a difference in plane types, which were the same, but from the ability to concentrate carriers and send them into the heart of a Japanese-held area. Although before the war it was frequently stated that the added weight and other design factors necessary in carrier planes made it impossible to operate them against shore-based aircraft, this turned out not to be true. Carriers were mobile units that, when assembled in sufficient numbers,
overwhelm an enemy’s airforce in any area that the United States desired to penetrarte. Development of radar and fighter-direction technique insured only a minimum of planes being used for defense and relieved the remainder for offensive missions against either shore installations or hostile fleet movements. With control of the air overhead and with adequarte air support, the Unitd States Fleet could move freely about the sea and land troops and equipment wherever the strategic plan demanded. Command of the sea also required the destruction of Japanese warships which might threaten our ships using Pacific waters. It was further nessary to deprive Japan of its merchant marine both to prevent its use to reinforce and supply enemy bases and to cripple the entire Japanese economy, which was dependent on shipping for the bulk of its oil, iron ore, cooking coal, rubber, aluminum and other nonferrous metals. and for much of its food. Naval aircraft were highly effective against shipping targets. Dive bombers were developed by the Navy as a means of controlling maximum accuracy with minimum hazard to planes in attacks on heavily armed warships. The torpedo plane was designed to launch the most lethal weapon yet devised for shipping attack. To these initial tactics were added three additional means of attacking ships: masthead bombing, pioneered in the Pacific by the Fifth Air Force, rocket attack, and strafing. Armed with these weapons, naval aircraft sank 745,000 tons of Japanese warships and cooperated with other agents in sinking an additional 167,000 tons. Included in the vessels sunk by naval aircraft, either alone or with other agents, were 6 out of Japan’s 12 battleships, 12 of 20 carriers, 18 of 40 cruisers. Of all sinkings in the class of destroyer or larger, naval and Marine aircraft accounted for 48 percent and for about 42 percent of combatant tonnage of all types. Naval aircraft were also responsible for damaging a large number of major enemy warships which then required extended periods of repair. This damage frequently had as important an effect on the course of the war as the sinkings. Hits on units of the Japanese carrier force in the Battle of the Coral Sea were an important factor in the abandoment of plans for invading Port Moresby. Similar damage in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons caused the withdrawal of Japanese naval forces, giving our sea and land forces in the Solomons a needed breathing spell and opportunity for reinforcement. Damage to Japanese carriers by carrier attacks in 1943 resulted in the permanent withdrawal of heavy warships from Rabaul and removed the threat of naval interference with the occupation of Bougainville. After the latter actions the Japanese refused again to risk heavy warships within range of naval aircraft, except with massed carrier support as in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, or on an admittedly- last-ditch sucide mission as in the Battle for Leyte Gulf and the last sortie of the Yamato. Important in naval air action against enemy warships was the ability to inflict damage with a minimum expenditure of effort. Only about 160 bombers and escorting fighters, carrying about 80 tons of bombs and torpedoes, made the attacks which sank 1 Japanese carrier and damaged another at the Coral Sea. In the attacks on the second day of the Battle of Midway, which resulted in the sinking of 4 carriers and proved to be the major turning point of the Pacific war, the hits on enemy carriers were inflicted by about 80 dive bombers. The naval air contribution to the crucial Battle of Guadlalcanal 350 attack sorties and less amounted to less than than 160 tons of bombs and torpedoes. A battleship, a cruiser, and 11 troop transports were credited sunk in whole or in part by these air attacks, and other vessels were damaged. In the battle for Leyte Gulf two elements of the 46 3-pronged attack were routed with a total expenditure of only 750 tons of bombs. Naval aircraft unaided sank over 1,500,000 tons of Japanese merchant vessels during the war; in cooperation with other forces they assisted in sinking another 200,000 tons. These figures included only vessels of 500 tons or over but not the hundreds of small barges, sampans, luggers, and other vessels sunk by- naval aircraft, whose total has never been compiled. About 50 percent, 800,000 tons, went down in the 4 monthS of the Philippines campaign from mid-September 1944 to mid-January 1945; 200,000 tons in the Truk, Marianas, and Rabaul raids of February 1944; and 100,000 more in March 1944 at Palau and elsewhere. The tonnage destroyed by naval planes exceeds that of any other agent except submarines which accounted for over half the total. Complete data on losses of smaller vessels are almost impossible to obtain. It is believed that submarines played a smaller and Army- and Navy aircraft and aerial mines a larger part in sinking these vessels. Carrier fighters devoted an enormous volume of effort to strafing and rocket attack on these vulnerable targets. Naval patrol bombers whose daily searches covered the entire western Pacific made hundreds of individual masthead-bombing and strafing attacks on isolated small ships. Army bombers and fighters were effective against these vessels along the East Indies, the Philippines, and Formosa. In the last months of the war mines laid by B–29’s further crippled the remnants of this junior merchant fleet, by then confined largely to the inland waters of Japan, and harassed even there by both carrier and naval patrol planes. Only 9 naval planes and only about 4 tons of bombs or torpedoes were required, on the average, to sink each 1,000 tons of Japanese war or merchant shipping. In executing its decisive campaigns against the enemy fleet and merchant marine, naval aviation expended only 14 percent of its attack effort and only about 4 percent of its combat sorties. Naval aircraft operated against enemy ground forces in all parts of the Pacific. Much of this effort was devoted to attacks whose main purpose was the attrition of enemy units either in advance of an invasion or on the Japanese from harassing communications. Strikes were also made against specific beachhead defenses and adjacent supply facilities in preparation for a landing. Finally, planes afforded direct close support to ground troops. Although the proportion in each of the three categories is not known, naval aircraft directed 54 percent of their total attack effort to enemy troops, weapons, equipment, defense installations, and supply facilities. This figure is exclusive of sorties to neutralize airfields or attacks on Japanese industrial and transportation facilities. The effectiveness of air support was measured not by the damage inflicted on installations but by the rapidity with which marines and soldiers advanced against the enemy. The variety of targets in close-support missions was very great and was dictated by the need of the troops, the

Japanese Merchant Vessels Sunk. ---Submarines alone accounted for 54 percent of sinkings; naval aircraft alone, 18 percent. Navy units participated in 77 percent of all sinkings and were the sole agents in 76 percent. The principal elements represented in the last bar of the chart are losses to British Empire and Netherlands forces and marine casualties.
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suitability of the target for airplane attack, and the availability of aircraft and other weapons such as naval gunfire and shore-based artillery. Enemy gun positions on the reverse side of a hill could be put out of operation only by aircraft. Planes frequently discovered their own targets behind Japanese lines and, as in the case of supplies or reinforcements, prevented their reaching the front lines. Frequently aircraft were called upon to keep the enemy down as friendly troops moved up. Such activities cannot be represented statistically. Although in ground combat the achievement of victory rested with the foot soldier, naval aviation provided him with invaluable assistance, facilitated his advance, and by its accurate methods of attack saved thousands of American lives. The foregoing discussion has set forth naval aviation’s part in the Pacific war. It demonstrates how effectively the Navy balanced the potentialities of air weapons against their limitations, developed them, and used them with other weapons to implement the strategic plan. Yet it is pertinent briefly to isolate naval aviation from the naval structure as a whole to consider its efficiency as an air force. One of the most pervasive phenomena of the war was the popular tendency to evaluate the effectiveness of air attack in terms of bomb tonnage. This was readily understandable in view of our national predilection for great size and quantitative measures and the ease of comparison which a tonnage figure provides. From the standpoint of military analysis bomb tonnage is to some extent a measure of effort but only occasionally a good measure of effectiveness. It was most significant in attacks on large urban centers made under favorable weather conditions so that most bombs could not help but hit the area. Yet even in the attacks on Japanese cities, there was wide variation in the area laid waste per ton of bombs depending on the type of bombs used and on the concentration of their fall. As the size of the target decreased, or when weather and other factors affected accuracy, the full tonnage dropped remained a cost of the attack, but the effect on the enemy depended on what proportion of the bombs hit the target. For example the Strategic Bombing Survey reported that of 30,- 000 tons of bombs dropped in high-altitude attacks on 3 large German oil and chemical plants with a total area of 31/2 square miles, only 1 bomb in 8 hit within the plant fences and only 1 of 30 inflicted physical damage to manufacturing facilities. Probably the largest Japanese targets customarily bombed by naval aircraft were airfields. The average large runway had an area of about 50 acres, considerably smaller than one of the oil plants mentioned above. The largest type of enemy ship attacked by naval planes, a large aircraft carrier, had a deck area of about 2 acres. Against a submarine, the lethal area in which a bomb had to hit was about a quarter acre and on a beachhead a gun position presented an area of only one two-hundredth of an acre. The tonnage of bombs dropped in attacks against such targets was of very little significance but the question often arose whether the target could he efficiently bombed at all. The statistical chance against hitting a 25-foot diameter gun revetment was 10,- 000 to 1 in high-altitude bombing, 600 to 1 in low-altitude glide bombing, 300 to 1 in the most accurate dive bombing, and about 100 to 1 in masthead bombing. The development of the high explosive rocket reduced the chance to 21 to 1; and, if it was desired to put the gun temporarily out of action while troops advanced or friendly bombers were carrying out an attack, this could he accomplished by a fighter plane with a few hundred rounds of ammunition. Except for patrol planes, naval aviation operated from carriers or from small land fields in advanced areas, both of which required small aircraft with limited bomb capacity. As an integral part of the naval forces, it had as targets primarily 49 naval objecctives--ships, parked aircraft, shore installations and close support of amphibious troops. Because the types of plane and the nature of the targets put a premium on accuracy and effectiveness of each bomb dropped, naval aviation did not engage in high-altilude, pattern bombing. Three methods of bomb attacks were commonly used: glide bombing at altitudes from 1,000 to 4,000 feet; dive bombing at the same altitudes but with an angle of 65° to 90°; and minimum-altitude, or masthead bombing, from 50 to 300 feet. Especially against war vessels aerial torpedoes were used at close range and low altitude. With the introduction of the highexplosive rocket in 1944, naval aviation acquired a weapon more suitable than bombs against such targets as small shipping and ground installations. An index of its importance was the use of over 100,000 rockets in the Okinawa campaign. Finally, naval planes employed machine guns and light cannon against many small targets. In measuring the tactical effectiveness of an air force it was not the volume of effort but attainment of objectives and the cost of results that counted. Each type of target and operation had to be considered separately; there was no common standard. To destroy half of Tokyo required 14,000 tons of bombs. Less than onetwentieth of this tonnage won the battle for Leyte Gulf; a few dozen dive bombers won the Battle of Midway. The comparative importance of these achievements is not found in any measure of sorties or bomb tonnage. They are in fact, not comparable at all, except as each was a vital contribution to victory achieved by skilled application of appropriate weapons.

Operation Rolling Thunder

Operation Rolling Thunder was the codename for an American bombing campaign during the Vietnam War. U.S. military aircraft attacked targets throughout North Vietnam from March 1965 to October 1968. This massive bombardment was intended to put military pressure on North Vietnam’s communist leaders and reduce their capacity to wage war against the U.S.-supported government of South Vietnam. Operation Rolling Thunder marked the first sustained American assault on North Vietnamese territory and represented a major expansion of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

How Could the U.S. Navy Take On China's 500-Ship Navy?

The Chinese expansion is intensified and further strengthened by its Coast Guard and Maritime Militia forces which will, together with Naval expansion, expand the Chinese Navy to nearly 800 ships by 2030.

The Chinese Navy is on track to reach nearly 500 ships in less than ten years, should its current pace of expansion continue, a circumstance fortified by a strong domestic shipbuilding infrastructure and multiple new platform programs such as new amphibious assault ships, destroyers, carriers and submarines all under construction.

A newly released Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps strategy document articulates concern about this Chinese expansion with a specific mind to what it cites as concerning Chinese ambitions to expand its global power and influence, control strategic waterways and access points, militarize the South China Sea and ultimately displace the United States as a global Naval leader.

The strategy, “Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated, All-Domain Naval Power,” explains that China’s Navy battle force has more than tripled in size in only two decades. The size and scope of the Chinese build-up is naturally of concern for long-term strategic reasons when it comes to global influence and stability. Yet the strategy makes the point that China’s rapid ascent as a Naval power could introduce more pressing near-term tactical military concerns. A large, multi-layered and capable force could, for instance, seek to simply “take over” areas quickly before the U.S. had an opportunity to fashion any kind of response.

“In the event of a conflict, China and Russia will likely attempt to seize territory before the United States and its allies can mount an effective response—leading to a fait accompli,” the strategy writes.

This prospect seems to introduce particular concerns regarding the Pacific, as the strategy indicates that China’s numerically superior force is “largely concentrated in the Western Pacific.” While China’s ambitions are known to be truly global in scale and reach in terms of expansionist aims, the country’s concentrated power in the Pacific compared with a much more dispersed U.S. Naval global operational presence means some kind of “fait accompli” annexation of Taiwan or areas within the South China Sea could be difficult to counter quickly.

The Chinese expansion is intensified and further strengthened by its Coast Guard and Maritime Militia forces which will, together with Naval expansion, expand the Chinese Navy to nearly 800 ships by 2030.

The Chinese are quickly adding a new class of Type 075 amphibious assault ships, as well as carriers and Type 055 destroyers, each platform introducing a new sphere of maritime warfare technologies.

“To support its multilayered fleet, China is also developing the world’s largest missile force, with nuclear capabilities, which is designed to strike U.S. and allied forces in Guam and in the Far East with everything from ballistic missiles to maneuverable cruise and hypersonic missiles,” the strategy writes.

China’s naval expansion has long been on the radar at the Pentagon, yet it is gaining even more traction as an area of concern given China’s aggressive behavior in the region and the reported technological sophistication of its Naval force.

“In conflict, excess People's Republic of China (PRC) industrial capacity, including additional commercial shipyards, could quickly be turned toward military production and repair, further increasing China’s ability to generate new military forces,” the strategy writes.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Social Structure, Ethnicity, and Military Effectiveness: Iraq, 1980–2004

This chapter investigates the effect of government policies intended to control internal division on overall military effectiveness. It specifically addresses the case of Iraq from 1980 to 2004. This case indicates that there is a distinct trade-off between improving military effectiveness and preserving internal security. Iraq was involved in three major wars from 1980 to 2004: the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the 2003 U.S. war. The Iraq case supports the hypothesis that discrimination in training and education does adversely influence military skill and quality. Discrimination also harmed the capacity of the military to respond quickly to developments on the battlefield. In general, the Iraq case shows that discrimination on ethnic grounds can significantly affect the ability to mobilize resources in war, and policies that are less discriminatory appear to mobilize resources more efficiently and to create higher levels of military effectiveness.

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International Alliances and Military Effectiveness: Fighting Alongside Allies and Partners

This chapter defines the alliances and the widespread assumption that institutions can effectively aggregate the capabilities of their members. It also elaborates how the independent variables influence the dependent variable of military effectiveness, clustering the findings according to the categories of skill and quality, integration, and responsiveness. It is found that alliance operations influenced the strategic command and control, tactical command and control, and intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. It is expected that alliance operations result to the reduction of integration, skill, and responsiveness and their capabilities grow increasingly heterogeneous. The political benefits provided by legitimacy are strong enough that state leaders will frequently look for allies and partners in military operations, despite some of the operational and tactical costs.

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Early development

Messengers have been employed in war since ancient times and still constitute a valuable means of communication. Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar each developed an elaborate system of relays by which messages were carried from one messenger post to another by mounted messengers traveling at top speed. They were thus able to maintain contact with their homelands during their far-flung campaigns and to transmit messages with surprising speed. Genghis Khan at the close of the 12th century not only emulated his military predecessors by establishing an extensive system of messenger posts from Europe to his Mongol capital but also utilized homing pigeons as messengers. As he advanced upon his conquests he established pigeon relay posts across Asia and much of eastern Europe. He was thus able to use these messengers to transmit instructions to his capital for the governing of his distant dominions. Before the end of the 18th century European armies used the visual telegraph system devised by Claude Chappe, employing semaphore towers or poles with movable arms. The Prussian army in 1833 assigned such visual telegraph duties to engineer troops.

At the same time that these elementary methods of signal communication were being evolved on land, a comparable development was going on at sea. Early signaling between naval vessels was by prearranged messages transmitted by flags, lights, or the movement of a sail. Codes were developed in the 16th century that were based upon the number and position of signal flags or lights or on the number of cannon shots. In the 17th century the British admiral Sir William Penn and others developed regular codes for naval communication and toward the close of the 18th century, Admiral Richard Kempenfelt developed a plan of flag signaling similar to that now in use. Later Sir Home Popham increased the effectiveness of ship-to-ship communication by improved methods of flag signaling.

The Transport tells that "Our objective is the proactive management of identifiable risks and the elimination of injury to personnel and damage to equipment".

Director General of Civil Aviation Authority. 3. Other departments as needed. *Management of aviation safety standards: Bear Aviation Administration safety s.

These precautions include hand hygiene, personal protective equipment (PPE), and respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette. The most important prevention in stoppi.

The Wright Brothers make the first controlled heavier than air flight . Race riots in Atlanta, results in 27 killed. The Prime Minister negotiates the Trea.

In response towards the event that occurred on September 11, 2001, CATSA was created in order to ensure consistency in the delivery of screenings across Cana.

During the Allied offensive on New Guinea, more precisely Wakde, Sarmi, and Biak, General Kenney used its airpower first to gain control of the air. After se.

Cold Fingers and Toes No matter what the weather is, some of us always seem to suffer from chronically cold fingers and toes. However, the cause may be as s.

b) Inspections: Airports must carry out inspections. There are different types of inspections depending on the situation - Regularly scheduled, continuous s.

If your toes become numb, cold, or blue, take the wrap off and reapply it more loosely. • Raise (elevate) the injured area above the level of your heart whil.

The following is a summary of the works called Safety, Accidents, and Investigations: Be Prepared for the Unexpected by Robert A. Battles. “This article desc.


Presents information on matter make up and behavior of matter, magnetism, methods of producing electricity, and direct current problem solving. Topic 1 presents information on matter, energy, electricity, and symbology. Topic 2 discusses batteries. Included are discussions on the battery cell, chemical processes, polarization, uses, and safety precautions. Topic 3 introduces direct current circuits and explains many of the formulas that are used routinely in electricity.

Introduces alternating current theory and power supplies. Topic 1 discusses the differences between alternating and direct current, magnetism, generation of alternating current, and characteristics of sine waves. Topic 2 introduces inductance characteristics, such as electromotive force, self inductance, and mutual inductance. Topic 3 introduces capacitance. Discussions are presented on the electrostatic field, capacitor characteristics, and series and parallel capacitive circuits. Topic 4 presents information on inductive and capacitive reactance, power in reactive circuits, and power factors. Topic 5 describes transformer characteristics.

Presents information on circuit measurements, circuit protection devices, and circuit control devices. Topic 1 discusses basic ohmmeters, ammeters, voltmeters, wattmeters, and frequency meters. Topic 2 discusses circuit protection devices, such as fuses and circuit breakers. Topic 3 discusses switches, solenoids, and relays.

Introduces electrical conductors, wiring techniques, and schematics. Topic 1 covers wire characteristics and insulation. Topic 2 covers conductor wiring techniques, including splicing, soldering, and lacing. Topic 3 covers schematic reading, marking systems, and some basic safety practices and precautions.

Covers basic construction and theory of operation of AC & DC generators and motors.

Presents an introduction to the theory of electronic emission and electron tubes. Topic 1 covers the construction, function, and theory of operation of the diode, triode, tetrode, and pentode. Topic 2 presents special-purpose tubes. The basic vacuum-tube power supply, including voltage and current regulation, and the methods used to isolate faulty components are covered in Topic 3.

Deals with solid-state devices and power supplies on a basic level. It presents a basic discussion of electron and hole flow in semiconductor devices and explains the construction, function, and theory of operation of the transistor. Also covered are the purpose modular circuitry and the advantages of integrated circuits over conventional transistor circuits, and the construction and use of the other solid-state devices such as the Zener diode, tunnel diode, varactor, silicontrolled rectifier, triac, unijunction transistor, and the more commonly used opto-electric devices. Fundamentals of solid-state power supplies are also covered.

Presents an introduction to what amplification is and how different types and classes of amplifiers affect amplification. Topic 1 discusses audio amplifiers. Topic 2 discusses video amplifiers and radio frequency amplifiers. Topic 3 presents differential, operational, and magnetic amplifiers. Factors which affect how an amplifier performs, such as impedance, feedback frequency response, and coupling, are also explained.

Introduces electronic wave-generating and wave-shaping circuits. Topic 1 discusses tuned circuits, resonance, resonant circuits, filter circuits, bandwidth, and special safety precautions to be observed when repairing tuned circuits. Topic 2 presents fundamental oscillator theory, including circuit configuration and frequency and amplitude stability of circuits. Topic 3 presents various waveforms, and waveform-generating circuits such as multivibrators, blocking oscillators, and time-based generators. Topic 4 describes limiters, dampers, differentiators, integrators, and counters.

Introduces wave propagation, transmission lines, and antenna theory. Topic 1 discusses wave motion, sound-wave terminology, light waves, properties of electromagnetic waves and the electromagnetic spectrum. Topic 2 discusses radio-wave propagation, including components of radio waves, electromagnetic fields, and effects of the Earth's atmosphere and terrain on radio waves. Topic 3 discusses transmission line theory, including terminology, types of lines, losses, length of lines, and discussions on characteristic impedance, electromagnetic fields, line reflections, standing waves, and standing-wave ratio. Topic 4 discusses several antennas, including the Hertz, Marconi, several arrays, and special antennas.

Presents an introduction to microwave principles. Topic 1 introduces waveguides in terms of theory and application various waveguide devices are explained. Topic 2 describes microwave components and circuits. Microwave components, tube principles and types, the decibel measurement system, and solid-state microwave devices are covered. Topic 3 describes microwave antennas. Antenna characteristics, reflector antennas, horn radiators, lens antennas, arrays, and frequency sensitive antennas are explained.

Presents information on the fundamental concepts of amplitude modulation, angle and pulse modulation, and demodulation. Topic 1 describes the theory of sine-wave generation and heterodyning. Also described are continuous-wave and amplitude-modulated systems. Topic 2 describes frequency, phase, and pulse modulation. Amplitude-, time-, duration-, position-, frequency-, and code-pulse modulation are explained. Topic 3 describes demodulation theory for continuous-wave, and amplitude-, frequency-, phase-, and pulse-modulated demodulators.

Presents the fundamental concepts of number systems and logic circuits that pertain to digital equipment. Topic 1 describes unit, number, base/radix, positional notation, most- and least-significant digit, carry and borrow principles, and the decimal-, binary-, octal-, hexadecimal-, and binary-coded decimal-number systems. Techniques for converting from one system to another are covered. Topic 2 includes computer logic AND, OR, NAND, and NOR gates inverters and Boolean algebra. Topic 3 presents exclusive OR and exclusive NOR circuits, adders, flip-flops, clocks, counters, registers, and logic families.

Presents information on the fundamental concepts of microelectronics, solid-state devices, and integrated circuits. Fabrication, packaging techniques, and equivalent circuits are discussed. Topic 2 discusses the Navy's 2M program including certification requirements, levels of maintenance, repair stations, 2M facilities, high-reliability soldering techniques, and test equipment. Topic 3 covers removal/replacement/repair of miniature and microminiature components, and safety precautions.

Presents general information on synchros, servos, gyros, and related devices. Topic 1 presents the theory of operations and alignment procedures for synchros. Topic 2 discusses servo systems, schematic and block diagrams, circuit component characteristics, and the components and data flow of a typical system. Topic 3 discusses characteristics, properties, components and other factors concerning the gyroscope. Topic 4 discusses related devices and compares standard synchro system connections with IC synchro connections, explains step-transmitter and receiver operation, and compares a resolver to a transformer.

Presents general information on the fundamental concepts of test equipment. Topic 1 covers test equipment administration and use, focusing on Navy equipment-related programs and basic procedures. Topic 2 describes various types of measurements. Topic 3 discusses the use of basic meters. Topic 4 describes operating procedures for common Navy test equipment. Topic 5 covers special application test equipment used in the electronics field. Topic 6 explains the purpose and operation of the oscilloscope and spectrum analyzer.

Presents general information on the fundamental concepts of radio-frequency communications. Topic 1 introduces the types of electrical telecommunications, their modes of operations, and Navy frequency band usage. Topic 2 discusses transmitters, receivers, and their control circuitry. Topic 3 describes equipment interfacing, teletypewriter and facsimile operations, security, quality monitoring, and safety. Topic 4 addresses a basic satellite communications system, equipment characteristics, theory of operation, and applications, both present and future. Topic 5 covers the lower frequency bands usage, microwave systems, the Naval Tactical Data System, portable equipment, and laser theory and applications.

Presents general information on radar theory, equipment, and maintenance. Topic 1 introduces basic radar concepts, principles of operation, transmission methods, and common types of radar systems. Topic 2 discusses major units of a radar including synchronizers, transmitters, duplexers, and receivers. Topic 3 addresses radar indicators and antennas. Topic 4 covers transmitter and receiver performance checks, radar support systems, and safety considerations peculiar to radar operation.

Provides the technician who works in the electrical and electronics fields a ready reference manual that will be of assistance during everyday work. It begins with information on mishap prevention and first aid, then covers other information useful to the technician such as commonly used formulas, data tables, general maintenance hints, and a listing of often used publications and documents.

Provides a ready reference source for the NEETS student. It begins with an alphabetized master glossary of the terms used throughout the NEETS.

Presents information on the fundamental concepts of test methods and practices. It is written with the junior practicing technician in mind and based on Electronics Installation and Maintenance Handbook (EIMB), TEST METHODS AND PRACTICES. There are five topics: "Basic Measurements," "Component Testing," "Quantitative Measurements," "Qualitative Measurements," and "Waveform Interpretation."

Introduces fundamental concepts of digital computers. Topic 1 discusses the history, classifications, and operational concepts of digital computers. Topic 2 presents information on hardware: central processing unit, computer storage, and input/output devices. Topic 3 covers software operating systems, utility programs, programming, and packaged software. Topic 4 covers data representation, computer coding systems, data storage concepts, and networks.

Introduces fundamental concepts of recording on magnetic tape and disks. Topic 1 states the prerequisites for magnetic recording and describes magnetic recording heads. Topic 2 describes types of magnetic tape, types of tape errors, causes of tape failure, methods of erasing tape, and procedures for handling tape. Topic 3 describes tape recorder heads and preventive maintenance requirements. Topic 4 describes tape transport systems, tape reeling systems, capstan speed control methods, and cleaning procedures. Topic 5 describes the function and main parts of a tape recorder's record and reproduce electronics. Topic 6 describes the seven most common magnetic tape recording specifications. Topic 7 describes the characteristics of digital magnetic tape recording. Topic 8 describes how floppy and hard disks are constructed, how data is recorded on them, and how they are handled and erased.

Presents general information on fiber optics and optical fibers. It encompasses the background on fiber optics fiber optic concepts optical fibers and cables optical splices, connectors, and couplers fiber optic measurement techniques optical sources and fiber optic transmitters optical detectors and fiber-optic receivers and fiber optic systems.

Military Videos

The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) completes the first scheduled explosive event of Full Ship Shock.

The Air Force Research Laboratory has created a new video animation that realistically depicts a Tactical High-power Operational Responder.

B-roll of an AW159 Wildcat launched from the United Kingdom's Royal Fleet Auxilary (RFA) Wave Knight (A389) flying by.

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Ross (DDG 71) fires an SM-2 in the Outer Hebrides as part of.

The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the readiness of the U.S. Navy’s P-8A Poseidon fleet met the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) requirements of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM).

The P-8A Poseidon is a multi-mission maritime aircraft. It is primarily used by Theater Commanders to conduct ASW operations to deny the enemy the effective use of its submarines against the U.S. and its allies. The Navy began developing and acquiring the P-8A Poseidon in April 2000 to replace its P-3C Orion fleet, which entered Navy service in 1962. In FY 2019, the estimated total acquisition cost for the Navy’s P 8A Poseidon fleet was $35 billion, and the estimated total operation and sustainment cost for the Navy’s P-8A Poseidon fleet was $55 billion. As of December 2019, the Navy planned for at least 117 P-8A Poseidon aircraft.

The P-8A Poseidon is a militarized variant of the Boeing 737 commercial aircraft, with system modifications to support the Navy maritime patrol mission requirements. The Navy developed the P-8A Poseidon to meet its need for rapid-response and long-range search capabilities. The Navy also needed an aircraft that could work independently or in conjunction with carrier strike groups and other joint and allied assets to ensure a maritime area free of surface and subsurface threats.

Table 1 demonstrates the P-8A Poseidon’s capabilities compared to the P-3C Orion.

The Navy plans to complete the transition from the P-3C Orion to the P-8A Poseidon in FY 2022. The Navy will use a mix of P-8A and P-3C aircraft until it completes its transition to the P-8A. As of October 13, 2020, the Navy’s maritime patrol aircraft inventory included 9 P-3C Orion and 104 P 8A Poseidon aircraft assigned to Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) patrol squadrons.

USEUCOM Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission

In its area of responsibility (AOR), USEUCOM faces the Russian Navy specifically, the Russian Northern Fleet. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Northern Fleet is Russia’s most capable naval force, and it operates technologically-advanced ballistic missile submarines that can reach targets in the United States. The Northern Fleet also operates attack submarines that can destroy surface, subsurface, and land targets. The U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet Deputy Commander for Theater Undersea Warfare stated that the U.S. deploys a range of assets to conduct ASW in the North Atlantic, consisting of aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and integrated underwater surveillance systems. Additionally, he stated that, with its improved capabilities, the P-8A Poseidon is the Navy’s primary air asset to effectively counter Russia’s most technologically advanced submarines capabilities, the P-8A Poseidon is the Navy’s primary air asset to effectively counter Russia’s most technologically advanced submarines.

[REDACTED] The officer-in-charge of the Sigonella Aviation Support Division (ASD) stated that Naval Air Station (NAS) Sigonella is the primary deployment site for P-8A Poseidon aircraft in the USEUCOM AOR.

Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared (ATFLIR)

Raytheon's Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared pod delivers pinpoint accuracy and reliability for air-to-air and air-to-ground mission support.

ATFLIR's unmatched technical advantages enable aviators to perform their missions, in the harshest conditions, with maximum efficiency and security. Its plug-and-play performance allows for easy installation and seamless operation for enhanced interoperability with coalition forces.

Raytheon's Advanced Targeting FLIR assures mission success by integrating advanced EO and IR sensors with one of the most powerful lasers on the market. ATFLIR can locate and designate targets day or night at ranges exceeding 40 nautical miles and altitudes surpassing 50,000 feet, outperforming comparable targeting systems. As a powerful net-enabler, it can pass tracking and targeting information to other nodes in the networked battlespace with the speed and precision.

Now in full-rate production, fully integrated and flight tested on all F/A-18 models, ATFLIR provides aircrews with unparalleled performance:

  • A substantial increase in target detection/recognition range
  • Pinpoint accuracy and assessment from longer standoff ranges
  • The most advanced laser designation capability
  • Superior EO/IR imagery

The program's Operational Evaluation was one of the most successful in U.S. Naval aviation history. ATFLIR met or exceeded all of the Navy's requirements, including effectiveness, survivability, reliability, and maintainability.

The streamlined ATFLIR integrates laser tracking and infrared targeting functions on F/A-18 aircraft into a single compact pod, freeing an air-to-air weapon station for other mission requirements. An IR marker has been inserted and integrated on ATFLIR and will enter production soon.

By incorporating the latest secure technology while allowing for future upgrade and enhancement, ATFLIR ensures continued aerial superiority. ATFLIR is positioned to serve as a critical node in FORCEnet, the fully networked battlespace of the future. Planned enhancements include:

  • EO camera and laser spot tracker improvements
  • Detection range increases
  • Electronics consolidation
  • Sensor fusion
  • Automatic target recognition

Truly technologically advanced, ATFLIR EO/IR sensor components utilize a single common optical path and continuous automatic boresight alignment to ensure accurate target coverage and battle-tested sensor-to-shooter tactical mission support.

Watch the video: Μέδουσα (May 2022).